National Affairs: The breakthrough in Israel-Lebanon talks means both sides now agree that Hezbollah is the problem, but whether Lebanon can do anything about it is a different question.
As representatives of Israel and neighboring countries, which have been formally at war since 1948, sit at the same table for the first time in 33 years, it’s natural to hear the soft flapping of the wings of peace doves.
That trend was reinforced when Israel’s ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter – Israel’s representative for these talks with Lebanon in Washington on Tuesday – spoke of a long-term vision in which there would be a clear border between the two countries and “the only reason we need to cross each other’s territory is to go to a trade suite or go to a trade suite.”
But Leiter is anything but starry-eyed pacifist, and no one can accuse him of naivety. As he emphasized, he was talking about a long-term vision, not something that will happen tomorrow, next month, next year, or even within a decade.
Or, as US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who hosted the talks, said, “This is a process, not an event.”
Thus, it is good to have hope—to dream of the day that a fine fence on the border of Rosh HaNikra will bear your name—but to harbor or create illusions is dangerous.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, US State Department Counsel Michael Needham and US Ambassador to Lebanon Michael Issa meet with Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter and Lebanese Ambassador to the United States Nada Hamadeh Mowad on April 14, 2026 (Credit: REKERKINUTERLA)
Israel and Lebanon are talking, which is great. But symbolism is not substance, and symbols do not bring peace and normalcy to the inhabitants of the North.
A more honest way to understand what happened this week is not as a breakthrough, but as the opening of a narrow and uncertain window, actually sitting somewhere between historical and delusional.
The problem is that Lebanon – or, more precisely, the government of Lebanon – is not the problem. Not the one who ordered the rocket and drone attacks on Israel. Hezbollah is doing that, and it’s taking orders from Iran.
Without Lebanon to join the fight, what is it worth?
Israel and Lebanon can do whatever they want, but if Lebanon can’t force its will on Hezbollah, what’s the point?
A simple example shows that the Lebanese government is impotent compared to Hezbollah. On March 24, Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry declared Iran’s ambassador to the country, Mohammad Reza Shebani, persona non grata, accusing him of violating diplomatic protocol and interfering in internal politics. He was allowed to leave till 29th of Chait.
It is now April 17, and Shebani is still there.
Why? Because Iran rejected the order, and Hezbollah – and its allies, including the powerful Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, who would forever dominate Lebanese politics – opposed it. Hezbollah instructed him to stay. And the Iranian embassy in Beirut remains behind the walls.
So it’s fair to ask: If the Lebanese government can’t even enforce an order to expel a diplomat it itself has declared persona non grata, how in the world is it going to disarm Hezbollah?
And therein lies the dilemma. The Lebanese government may have the desire to settle with Israel, but what it lacks – clearly – is the means to accomplish it.
So what good are these talks? What do they mean? Why do they matter?
They matter because, for the first time in decades, the conversation itself has changed.
Over the years, the problem has not been hard to identify: Hezbollah. Whether Lebanon itself sees the same is less clear. What emerged in Washington this week is not a new diagnosis, but a possible new alignment — elements of Israel and the Lebanese government, at least rhetorically, pointing to the same source of instability.
Or, as Leiter put it after the meeting, “We are both united to liberate Lebanon from a force called Hezbollah that is under Iranian occupation.”
That does not solve the problem. But it does identify.
What this means is that Israel may have found a potential partner in Lebanon that sees the issue in the same vein. That’s good news. The bad news is that the Lebanese government, under President Joseph Aoun, may be a partner, but it is not necessarily an enforcer.
Still, that partnership could serve as the basis for a better structure than the one that exists today.
That better structure includes a reported proposal for a layered security arrangement: a demilitarized zone in southern Lebanon up to the Litani River; a second zone extending northward to the Avali River, which empties into the Mediterranean north of Sidon, without military forces but with a limited police presence; And, further north, areas under the control of the Lebanese army, heavy weapons embargoes and some form of US-led international oversight. On paper, at least, the outlines of a more stable arrangement are beginning to emerge.
“On paper,” however, is the operative phrase.
Other cease-fires looked good on paper, too – ending the Second Lebanon War in 2006, and calling for the Lebanese army to take action against Hezbollah in November 2024. Lebanese officials said they did — until Hezbollah opened fire on Israel again on March 2, making clear that Lebanese officials overstated their case.
And yet, these talks are happening at a particularly opportune time. Hezbollah’s capabilities have declined, Iran’s position has weakened, and the Lebanese government is showing tentative signs of striving for greater independence.
Talks went ahead in Washington despite strong opposition from both Hezbollah and Iran, with Hezbollah leader Naim Qasim warning that “moving forward with the talks would represent capitulation and capitulation.”
In the past, such words — especially when they came from his predecessor Hassan Nasrallah — might have been enough to deter Beirut. This time, they weren’t.
But it is one thing to go ahead with talks despite Hezbollah’s objections. It is another thing to implement whatever decision is made there on those objections.
And here the central paradox becomes apparent. The party that holds most of the cards – Hezbollah – is not at the table, not participating, rejects the process, and continues to fire on Israel. Negotiation, in essence, aims to resolve a problem controlled by an actor outside the diplomatic framework.
America is trying to change that equation. By clearly separating the Israel-Lebanon track from parallel negotiations with Iran, Washington wants to redefine the diplomatic arena, treating Lebanon as a sovereign state rather than just an extension of Iran’s regional network.
Taking Lebanon out of Iran’s orbit
The broader goal is clear: take Lebanon out of Iran’s orbit, but start gradually.
For decades, Hezbollah has acted as Tehran’s vanguard on Israel’s northern border, blurring the line between Lebanese state interests and Iranian objectives. By insisting that any settlement in Lebanon be negotiated directly between Beirut and Jerusalem, rather than tied to a broader US-Iran accord, Washington is trying to reinforce a different principle: Lebanon’s future should be decided in Beirut, not Tehran.
Whether that theory can hold in reality, given Hezbollah’s formidable power, is another question entirely.
Which brings us back to where we started.
These negotiations are important and limited. Important because they indicate a change in how the problem is perceived. Limited because the solution depends on forces not present in the table.
Success, if there is one, is not talking about Israel and Lebanon. It is that, for the first time, they are talking about the same problem.
Whether that shared understanding can be translated into reality does not depend on what is said in Washington, but Lebanon can finally do something it has struggled with for decades: act as a sovereign state within its own borders.
For that to happen, certain conditions—long absent—need to hold.
Some of them may now, tentatively, be emerging: a Hezbollah state weakened enough to create limited space for authority; a population weary of years of economic decline and conflict; Leadership that speaks out about sovereignty and the need for the military to be the sole authority; And an unusual alignment of outside pressures—from Washington, Jerusalem, and the Gulf—pushing in the same direction.
Add to that the gains created by Lebanon’s economic crisis, and for the first time in years, there is at least one conceivable path toward greater state control.
Another, less-discussed factor may also be at play: the mood within Lebanon’s Shia community. There are signs – still limited, but not insignificant – of growing fatigue.
Displacement, economic hardship, and repeated rounds of conflict have taken their toll, and there are scattered reports of frustration in southern Lebanon and the Shiite suburbs of Beirut at the price paid for Hezbollah’s ongoing battles with Israel.
This is not open rebellion, however, and should not be exaggerated. Hezbollah still commands deep loyalty among the Lebanese Shiite population, which makes up an estimated one-third of the country’s population. Yet a quiet erosion of support — more exhaustion than organized opposition — can, over time, have an effect.
Still, one should not hold one’s breath. After all, this is a country where the government can declare Iran’s ambassador persona non grata, set a deadline for his departure, and then watch him completely ignore the order. This event is not a side story; This is the story – a reminder of where power still lies in Lebanon, and how difficult it will be to shift.
